The word beachhead
when used in a military context defines a shore-based landing zone wrested from
an enemy and secured as a route of access to inland targets. The key word
invaders have learned often at a high cost over the centuries is secured. During World War II we heard of
beachheads being fought for and secured at places called Guadalcanal and Bougainville in
the Solomon Islands, Tarawa in the
Gilberts, and a succession of other Japanese strongholds across the Pacific.
Much was learned about this highly specialized form of warfare. The costly
landing on Makin Island led to our
eventual recall of troops and the abandonment of the prize when proved
ill-advised and even unnecessary.
From the disastrous Dieppe raid by
British Commandos on the French coast in August, 1942 the Allies learned at
their cost just how difficult it was to make a successful landing on a defended
piece of hostile coast line. Dieppe became a haunting byword for the planners
pondering the inevitable invasion of Fortress Europe. For the chance of
success, the invading force must have control of the sea, control of the air
over the target and its surroundings and the advantage of over-arching surprise.
As we were about to learn at an Italian seaport town known as Anzio, the choice
of committed leadership of such a mission might be just as important as any of
the other factors along with a requirement for up-to-the-minute intelligence.
The allied situation in the closing
days of 1943 saw an Italian campaign bogged down after the Salerno landings at
the country’s southern tip as American, British and Empire troops found
themselves facing determined German resistance after Italy’s rather meaningless
surrender. More than ever, Hitler’s forces were bent on denying the taking of
Rome. Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and British senior commanders drew up
plans for a surprise invasion midway between the main line of resistance and
Rome to the north, thus circling around the German “Gustav line” and offering a
speedy route to the Italian capital. Eisenhower, the only U.S. commander who
had the voice to question the timing of such a plan had transferred his command
to concentrate solely on the upcoming (and very secret) “Operation Overlord” –
the invasion of Europe – leaving the British in charge of operations in Italy.
With the direct influence of Churchill, whose predilection for an assault on
“the soft underbelly” of Europe was still alive and well, the plan once
cancelled, was resurrected. The Brits appointed U.S. Major General John P.
Lucas, a veteran of WWI and C.O of the Fifth Army’s VI Corps to lead the
invasion of the port city of Anzio on Jan. 22, 1944, in the process “borrowing”
assault craft and other resources heading to the Normandy build up.
Lucas was convinced the whole
enterprise was looking like a repeat of Churchill’s disastrous Gallipoli
campaign of 1916 which had nearly brought down the British government and had brought
an end to Churchill’s career. (In fact no less a figure than that of George
Patton told Lucas “you’re being set up to be the ‘fall guy’ when this thing fails
John”.)
Surprisingly the Anzio landing
itself (Operation SHINGLE) was a
complete surprise to Field Marshal Kesselring and the entire German High
Command, and the beachhead objectives had been reached by noontime the 22nd
without significant Allied casualties. One nine-mile stretch of beach was found
to be defended by a single company. Then the Americans’ worst fears began to
come true, leading to four months of some of the most bitter fighting of WWII.
On Feb. 22nd, Lucas was replaced by Major General Lucian Truscott
just as a major German counter attack began.
It would be easy to blame Lucas
in the aftermath of what turned into a costly disaster, for delaying his march
inland for four days while consolidating his position on the beachhead and
waiting for the Merchant ships and their striking
civilian workers to begin landing the needed supplies after already moving
almost ten miles beyond the beachhead. Still convinced he was leading a flawed
enterprise, under constant air attack and without reliable intelligence on what
he faced, the move off the beaches was led by
Commando’s, U.S. Army Rangers, paratroopers and other lightly-armed
special forces carrying only grenades, bazookas, and short-range weaponry
against the most elite of Hitler’s front line soldiers arriving on the scene. As
a tragic example of the misuse of “infantry” during the break-out and the
assault on the town of Cisterna, out of two battalions of the 4th
Rangers and 15th Infantry numbering 767 men, only 6 returned!
German paratroopers prepare for battle
during Anzio breakout. German Federal Archive photo
Author’s Notes: I
believe the entire undertaking was ill-conceived and that if Eisenhower had
still been on the ground, it would never have taken place. Bringing together
British, French and American forces who had not fought together before, and
then placing them under divided
commands inspired confusion at every level. It was left up to Lucas to decide
on objectives after landing, and as it turned out his forces were greatly outnumbered. Further, the
operation might easily have compromised the secret preparations for OVERLORD. Lessons learned: Elite Special Forces
should not be used as regular infantry. Political interests (the taking of
Rome) should not determine battlefield strategy. Two Admirals, four Generals plus
Churchill’s long shadow! Too many chefs
ruin the broth. Finally, planners and top leaders may have erred, but
the young fighting men who fought the battle were among the most courageous and
hard-hitting of any who paid in blood for final victory in World War II in
Europe.
As an eleven-year-old, I was
personally touched by Anzio when a young family friend – Jack Mueller – lost
his leg there when his jeep hit a land mine. I will never forget sitting
proudly with his arm around me during his visit to our home after he returned.
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