As
Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. Kichisaburo Nomora and his companion Saburo
Kurusu, another “Peace Envoy” from the Emperor waited in the White House for an
early morning meeting with Secretary of State Cordell Hull on December 7th,
1941, they were the only people in that building who did not know that an hour
earlier, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii had been bombed by the country they represented.
In fact – according to historian Eri Hotta - those somber-faced and dignified
statesmen would not learn until en route back to their homeland several weeks
later just how they had been “played” by their military leaders in Tokyo in
order to insure the full “surprise” nature of the attack cast by President
Roosevelt as the “day which will live in infamy”; (Thereby unintentionally
giving the U.S. President the rallying call which would bring about the
commitment of a reluctant America to “total war”.)
Eri Hotta’s recently released book “JAPAN – 1941” reveals for the first
time an intimate and comprehensive backstage look at the combination of
ambition, self-delusion, Service rivalries, extreme factionalism between
ministries and a profound absence of political courage which led Japan into a
war they themselves believed was “unwinnable”. It will come as a surprise to
many readers that among Japan’s highest echelons, there had been at least as
much opposition to war with the U.S. as there was approval of the idea. For me,
the biggest surprise was to learn that even Hideki Tojo – looked upon as the
biggest “war monger” among them – had strong doubts, and was firmly against a
“surprise” attack. In the process she
also focuses the spotlight of history on Washington’s not-insignificant role in
missing many opportunities to postpone or even to avoid completely the
necessity of fighting two simultaneous wars.
Tokyo-born Historian Eri Hotta does
not in any way come across as an “apologist” but in fact portrays the
short-sightedness and chaotic, often dysfunctional picture of an Empire
spinning out of control in 1941 with an honesty made the more impressive because of her unique credentials.
Among factors not often considered
by Allied critics – and obviously overlooked in the intelligence being
presented in Washington in 1940-41 – was the immensity of the “Russia Problem”
in the eyes of Japanese military and government leaders who had pressed for
occupation of northern Manchuria and then the China invasion itself as a
protective buffer. It was the fear of creeping communism which made the
tri-partite agreement with Germany and Italy at first attractive to Tokyo. Later,
with the quagmire which resulted from the China adventure impoverishing the
homeland, Japan might have welcomed a chance to get out if presented with a way
of “saving face” with their own Kwantung Army in the process.
With an aggressive and
expanding military hierarchy pressing a weak Prime Minister (Prince Konoe) at home and America freezing their assets and
imposing an embargo against oil and strategic metal shipments, against the
background of an economically- pinched civil population, Japan chose to carry out the conquest and occupation of
Northern French Indo China (Viet Nam). With a total misreading of U.S.
intentions and a miscalculation of the likelihood of a German victory in
Europe, the Empire of Japan began to set in motion an increasingly irresistible
slide toward war. Aware of a declining capacity to prevail in such a course,
the momentum of this slide reached its tipping point with a series of government
meetings in Tokyo setting November 26, 1941 as the date negotiations would end
and the nation would be committed to war with the U.S..
Ironically, it was Isoroku Yamamoto
who more than any other Japanese leader opposed that war who would plan the
Pearl Harbor attack, and a reluctant Emperor Hirohito – who was the only one
who could have intervened to stop it – who received a “Peace Letter” from
President Roosevelt three hours after it was too late to do so.
In the final days of November, 1941
there were a dozen moments when a Pacific war could have been averted if a tiny
handful of human beings on both sides had acted differently or more swiftly.
“Japan
1941 – Countdown to Infamy” presents one of the most
important and far-reaching insights into the genesis of WWII in the Pacific
extant today. (The Japanese flag in the background is an American G.I.’s
hard-won memento of WWII campaigns stretching across the Pacific.)
Photo & Flag
– Al Cooper
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